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Abstract. A dynamical system is a pair (X, f), where X is a topological space and
f : X → X is continuous. Kremer observed that the language of propositional linear
temporal logic can be interpreted over the class of dynamical systems, giving rise to a
natural intuitionistic temporal logic. We introduce a variant of Kremer’s logic, which we
denote ITLc♦, and show that it is decidable. We also show that minimality and Poincare´
recurrence are both expressible in the language of ITLc♦, thus providing a decidable logic
capable of reasoning about non-trivial asymptotic behavior in dynamical systems.
1. Introduction
Dynamical (topological) systems are mathematical models of change or movement over time.
Formally, they are structures of the form X = (X, T , f), where (X, T ) is a topological space
and f : X → X is a continuous function [1]. This rather broad definition allows them to be
found in multiple disciplines, including mathematics, physics and biology. The theory of
such systems can be readily formalized in standard mathematical foundations such as set
theory or even second-order arithmetic, but these are undecidable and subject to Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorems [25]. On the other hand, Go¨del’s proof relies on number-theoretic
considerations which are not necessarily relevant to the study of dynamical systems. In
view of this, the dynamic topological logic project aimed to develop a logical framework for
formal reasoning about topological dynamics which was decidable and complete yet powerful
enough to prove non-trivial theorems. Unfortunately, the project was set back by a series of
negative results, including the undecidability of full dynamic topological logic (DTL), leading
to a search for decidable variants of DTL which remained expressive enough for its intended
applications. Our goal in this paper is to present such a variant. Following a suggestion of
Kremer, we recast dynamic topological logic as an intuitionistic temporal logic, and show it
to be a decidable logic powerful enough to reason about non-trivial recurrence phenomena
in arbitrary dynamical systems.
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1.1. Dynamic topological logic. As observed by Artemov et al. [3], it is possible to reason
about dynamical systems within modal logic; the topological structure can be represented
via a modality, which we will denote , interpreted as an interior operator in the sense of
Tarski [42], while the action of f can be captured by a temporal-like modality, which we will
denote ◦. They introduced the logic S4C, and proved that it is decidable, as well as sound
and complete for the class of all dynamical systems. Kremer and Mints [32] considered
a similar logic, called S4H, and also showed it to be sound and complete for the class of
dynamical systems where f is a homeomorphism.
The latter also suggested adding the ‘henceforh’ operator, , from linear temporal logic
(LTL) [35]. This allowed them to represent asymptotic phenomena, including the non-trivial
Poincare´ recurrence theorem, which we discuss in §11.2. The resulting tri-modal system was
called dynamic topological logic (DTL), and the positive results concerning S4C and S4H
led to the expectation that DTL may also be well-behaved, possibly leading to applications
in e.g. specialized computer-assisted proof. Unfortunately, it was soon shown by Konev et
al. that dynamic topological logic is undecidable over the class of all dynamical systems [28].
Although the axiomatization of DTL proposed in [32] is incomplete [22], we later provided a
sound and complete axiomatization [21]. However, Konev et al. showed that DTL over the
class of dynamical systems with a homeomorphism is not even computably enumerable [29].
This led to a search for decidable variants of DTL which retained the capacity for
reasoning about the asymptotic behavior of dynamical systems. Gabelaia et al. [23] proposed
dynamic topological logics with finite, but unbounded, time and showed them to be decidable,
although not in primitive recursive time. Kremer instead proposed a restriction to dynamical
systems where the topology is a partition [31], while we considered interpretations over
minimal systems, which we will discuss in §11.1; the DTL’s obtained in the latter two cases
are decidable.
However, as a general rule, all decidable variants of DTL with continuous functions that
are currently known are obtained by either restricting the class of dynamical systems over
which they are interpreted, or restricting the logics to reason about finitely many iterations
of f .1 This makes them unsuitable to capture asymptotic behavior of arbitrary dynamical
systems, which motivated interest in DTL.
1.2. Intuitionistic dynamic topological logic. There is another variant of DTL which
does not have either of these restrictions, yet whose decidability was never settled: Kremer’s
intuitionistic version of DTL, proposed in unpublished work [30], and here denoted ITLc.
It is well-known that propositional intuitionistic logic can be seen as a fragment of S4 via
the Go¨del-Tarski translation [42] (see §4 for details), and indeed they share very similar
semantics. In particular, intuitionistic logic can be interpreted topologically. One can use
this idea to present a version of dynamic topological logic which removes the modality ,
and instead interprets implication intuitionistically. A feature of such semantics is that all
formulas are interpreted by open sets, and as Kremer observed, the truth condition for ◦ϕ
will preserve the openness of the truth valuation when f is a continuous function. On the
other hand, Kremer also observed that the classical truth condition for ϕ did not always
produce open sets, and thus he proposed to take the interior of this classical interpretation
(see §3 for details).
1An exception to this is the ‘temporal over topological’ fragment discussed in [32], but this fragment is
too weak to express continuity.
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We will follow Kremer in using intuitionistic temporal logic to reason about dynamical
systems, but we will replace  by ‘eventually’, denoted ♦; note that the two are not
inter-definable intuitionistically [4]. Working with ♦ is convenient because the classical
interpretation of ♦ϕ will indeed yield open sets. We will also add a universal modality, and
call the resulting logic ITLc♦ (Intuitionistic Temporal Logic of Continuous functions).
1.3. Intuitionistic temporal logics. The logic ITLc is not the first intuitionistic variant
of temporal logic. Ewald considered intuitionistic logic with ‘past’ and ‘future’ tenses [17]
and Davies suggested an intuitionistic temporal logic with ◦ [13], which was endowed with
Kripke semantics and a complete deductive system by Kojima and Igarashi [27]. Logics
with ◦, over bounded time were later studied by Kamide and Wansing [26], and over
infinite time by Nishimura [38], who provided a sound and complete axiomatization for an
intuitionistic variant of propositional dynamic logic PDL. For logics with ◦,♦,, Balbiani
and Die´guez [5] axiomatized the ‘here-and-there’ variant of LTL, and with Boudou and
Die´guez we showed that intuitionistic LTL over expanding frames, denoted ITLe, is decidable
[10]. Each of these logics use semantics based on bi-relational models for intuitionistic modal
logic, studied systematically by Simpson [41]. Topological semantics for modal logic in
general, and for temporal logic with ‘past’ and ‘future’ in particular, have also been studied
by Davoren et al. [14, 15].
1.4. Our results. The main contribution in this article is that ITLc♦ is decidable, which we
prove using techniques first introduced in [18]. There are a few simplifications due to the
intuitionistic semantics, which allows us to work only with open sets in topological models,
as well as partial orders rather than preorders in relational models. The semantics of DTL
is reduced to countable (non-deterministic) quasimodels in [18], but those of ITLc♦ can be
reduced to finite quasimodels; this is, of course, good news, but requires new combinatorial
work with what we call irreducible moments. We will also show that minimality, as well as
the Poincare´ recurrence theorem, can be represented in ITLc♦, thus providing a promising
new direction for the dynamic topological logic project. Nevertheless, this is an exploratory
work, and many crucial questions remain open: our techniques do not provide us with
an axiomatization, and the current decision procedure is super-exponential, meaning that
further advances are needed to obtain a tractable logic.
Layout. The layout of the article is as follows.
§2. A brief review of some basic notions, including topology and its relation to partial orders.
§3. Introduction to the logic ITLc♦ and its intended semantics using (dynamical topological)
models.
§4. A comparison of our logic ITLc♦ to some related logics found in the literature.
§5. Introduction to labeled spaces and systems. These generalize both models and quasi-
models, and the latter are defined as a special case.
§6. Construction of the limit model of a quasimodel, used to prove that ITLc♦ is sound for
the class of quasimodels.
§7. Introduction to moments, which are essentially the points in the ‘weak canonical quasi-
model’ MΣ.
§8. Discussion of simulations, the essential tool for extracting quasimodels from models.
§9. Introduction to the structure IΣ of irreducible moments as a finite substructure of MΣ.
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§10. Proof that a formula is falsifiable if and only if it is falsifiable over an effectively bounded
quasimodel, obtaining the decidability of ITLc♦ as a corollary.
§11. Discussion on the capacity of ITLc♦ to reason about minimality and Poincare´ recurrence,
including a proof that the full ITLc is decidable on the class of minimal systems.
§12. Concluding remarks, including several open questions.
2. Binary Relations and Topology
In this section we establish some of the notation we will use and recall some basic notions
from topology. In particular, we discuss Alexandroff spaces, which link partial orders and
topological spaces.
2.1. Sets and relations. We follow fairly standard conventions for sets and relations, which
we briefly outline for reference.
The first infinite ordinal will be denoted ω, the cardinality of a set A will be denoted
#A, and its powerset will be denoted P(A). For a binary relation R ⊆ A×B and X ⊆ A,
we write R(X), or simply RX, for {y ∈ B : ∃x ∈ X x R y}, and we write R−1 for the inverse
of R, that is, {(y, x) ∈ B × A : (x, y) ∈ R}. We write dom(R) for R−1(B) and rng(R) for
R(A). R is total if dom(R) = A, and surjective if rng(R) = B.
For any X ⊆ A, we define the restriction of R to X by R  X = R ∩ (X ×B), except
when A = B, in which case R  X = R∩ (X×X). If, moreover, S ⊆ B×C, the composition
of R and S is S ◦ R ⊆ A × C, which we may sometimes denote SR. If B = A (so that
R ⊆ A×A), recall that R is
(a) reflexive, if for every x ∈ A, x R x;
(b) antisymmetric, if for every x, y ∈ A, if x R y and y R x, then x = y;
(c) transitive, if for every x, y ∈ A, if x R y and y R z, then x R z;
(d) linear, if, for all x, y ∈ A, either x R y or y R x, and
(e) serial, if for every x ∈ A there is y ∈ A such that x R y.
A transitive, reflexive relation is a preorder and a transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric relation
is a partial order.
A poset is a pair A = (|A|,4A), where |A| is any set and 4A ⊆ |A| × |A| is a partial
order; we will generally adopt the convention of denoting the domain of a structure A by
|A|. If X ⊆ |A|, A  X is the structure obtained by restricting each component of A to X.
Define ↓A a = {b : b 4A a} and ↑A a = {b : b <A a}. We will generally write 4, ↓, ↑ instead
of 4A, ↓A, ↑A when this does not lead to confusion. We will also use the notation a ≺ b for
a 4 b but b 64 a, while a ≺1 b means that a ≺ b and there is no c ∈ |A| such that a ≺ c ≺ b.
An element a ∈ |A| is greatest if b 4 a for all b ∈ |A|, and maximal if b 6 a for any b ∈ |A|.
Least and minimal are defined analogously.
A partial order A is a tree if it has a greatest element r, and for every x ∈ |A|, ↑x is
finite and linearly ordered. Note that in our presentation, the leaves of a tree are its minimal
elements.
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2.2. Notions from topology. Here we recall the basic definitions from topology we will
use, including Alexandroff spaces, which link topological spaces and partial orders. A more
in-depth introduction can be found in a standard text such as [37].
Definition 2.1. A topological space is a pair X = (|X|, TX) , where |X| is a set and TX a
family of subsets of |X| satisfying
(1) ∅, |X| ∈ TX;
(2) if U, V ∈ TX then U ∩ V ∈ TX and
(3) if O ⊆ TX then
⋃O ∈ TX.
The elements of TX are called open sets. Complements of open sets are closed sets. If
x ∈ U ∈ TX, we say that U is a neighborhood of x.
If X,Y are topological spaces, a function f : |X| → |Y| is continuous if f−1(V ) is
open whenever V ⊆ |Y| is open, and open if f(U) is open whenever U ⊆ |X| is open. A
homeomorphism is an open, continuous bijection.
It is readily verified that the composition of continuous functions is continuous, and
similarly the composition of open functions is open; this will be useful throughout the text.
If X is a topological space and A ⊆ |X| is not open, A can still be approximated by an open
set from below. To be precise, given a set A ⊆ |X|, its interior, denoted A◦, is defined by
A◦ =
⋃
{U ∈ TX : U ⊆ A} .
Similarly, we define the closure A as |X| \ (|X| \A)◦; this is the smallest closed set containing
A.
Perhaps the most standard example of a topological space is given by the real line R,
where U ⊆ R is open if, whenever x ∈ U , there is ε > 0 such that (x− ε, x+ ε) ⊆ U . More
generally, let (X, d) be a metric space; that is, d : X ×X → [0,∞) satisfies
(a) d(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y,
(b) d(x, y) = d(y, x), and
(c) the triangle inequality, d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z).
Then, for ε > 0 and x ∈ X, define the open ball Bε(x) by
Bε(x) = {y ∈ X : d(x, y) < ε},
and say that U ⊆ X is open if, for all x ∈ U , there is ε > 0 such that Bε(x) ⊆ U . The
Euclidean spaces Rn are all examples of metric spaces and are always assumed to be equipped
with the topology we have just defined, as is the set of rational numbers, denoted Q. The
set of open balls on a metric space is a basis for its topology, in the following sense:
Definition 2.2. A collection B of subsets of a set X is a basis if
(1)
⋃
B∈B B = X, and
(2) whenever B0, B1 ∈ B and x ∈ B0 ∩B1, there exists B2 ⊆ B0 ∩B1 such that x ∈ B2.
The basis B generates a topology on X defined by letting U ⊆ X be open if and only if, for
every x ∈ U , there is B ∈ B with x ∈ B ⊆ U .
Topological spaces can also be seen as a generalization of preorders. If W is a preordered
set, consider the topology D4 on |W| given by setting U ⊆ |W| to be open if and only if,
whenever w ∈ U , we have ↓w ⊆ U (so that the sets of the form ↓w provide a basis for D4).
We call D4 the down-set topology of 4. Similarly, the family of upwards-closed subsets of
|W| will be denoted by U4, and is the up-set topology of 4. Topologies of this form are
Alexandroff topologies [2]:
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Definition 2.3. A topological space A is an Alexandroff space if any one of the following
equivalent conditions occurs:
(1) whenever O ⊂ TA, then
⋂O ∈ TA;
(2) every x ∈ |A| has a ⊆-least neighborhood;
(3) there is a preorder 4 on |A| such that TA = D4, or
(4) there is a preorder 4 on |A| such that TA = U4.
It is readily verified that if TA = D4, then 4 is uniquely defined,2 and we will denote
it by 4A. We remark that intuitionistic logic cannot distinguish between preordered sets
and partially ordered sets, so without loss of generality we may work only with Alexandroff
spaces generated by a poset. We will tacitly identify (|A|,4A) with (|A|, TA).
Observe that all finite topological spaces are Alexandroff; in fact, all locally finite spaces
are Alexandroff. The following is easily verified:
Lemma 2.4. Say that a topological space A is locally finite if every point of |A| has a
neighborhood U such that #U < ω. Then, every locally finite space is Alexandroff.
It will also be useful to characterize the continuous functions on a poset:
Lemma 2.5. If W,V are preorders and g : |W| → |V|, then g is continuous with respect
to the down-set topologies on W,V if and only if, whenever v 4W w, it follows that
g(v) 4V g(w).
In other words, continuous maps on posets are simply monotone maps. Alexandroff
spaces will be very useful to us throughout the text, as our goal is to reduce intuitionistic
temporal logic over arbitrary dynamical systems to a computably bounded set of finite
structures. With this, we are ready to define the logics that we are interested in.
3. Syntax and Semantics
In this section we will introduce the logic ITLc♦ and its semantics; in fact, we will first define
an extended logic ITLc, containing both our logic and Kremer’s logic ITLc. Fix a countably
infinite set P of propositional variables. Then, the full (intuitionistic temporal) language LI
is defined by the grammar (in Backus-Naur form)
ϕ,ψ := ⊥ | p | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ⇒ψ | ◦ϕ | ♦ϕ | ϕ | ∃ϕ | ∀ϕ,
where p ∈ P. Here, ◦ is read as ‘next’, ♦ as ‘eventually’, and  as ‘henceforth’. We also use
∼ϕ as a shorthand for ϕ⇒⊥ and ϕ⇔ψ as a shorthand for (ϕ⇒ψ) ∧ (ψ⇒ϕ).
Denote the set of subformulas of ϕ ∈ LI by sub(ϕ), and the length of ϕ (or, more
precisely, #sub(ϕ)) by ‖ϕ‖. We will also be interested in certain sublanguages of LI , which
only allow some set of modalities M ⊆ {◦,♦,, ∃, ∀}, and we will denote such a fragment
by LI M . Note that LI M always contains Booleans and implication, even though they
will not be listed in M . We will be primarily interested in the language LI♦ = LI  {◦,♦,∀}.
Formulas of LI are interpreted on dynamical systems over topological spaces, or dynamical
topological systems.
2In this article we will be biased towards using the down-set topology since it is more natural for the
constructions we will introduce in §7.
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Definition 3.1. A dynamical (topological) system is a triple X = (|X|, TX, fX) where
(|X|, TX) is a topological space and fX : |X| → |X| is a continuous function. A valuation on
X is a function J·K : LI → TX such thatJ⊥K = ∅Jϕ ∧ ψK = JϕK ∩ JψKJϕ ∨ ψK = JϕK ∪ JψKJϕ⇒ψK = ((|X| \ JϕK) ∪ JψK )◦J◦ϕK = f−1X JϕKJ♦ϕK = ⋃n<ω f−nX JϕKJϕK = (⋂n<ω f−n JϕK )◦J∃ϕK = |X| if JϕK 6= ∅ and ∅ otherwise;J∀ϕK = |X| if JϕK = |X| and ∅ otherwise.
A dynamical system X equipped with a valuation J·KX is a (dynamical topological) model.
If fX is a homeomorphism we will say that X is invertible. Note that, for a propositional
variable p, JpK can be any subset of |X|, provided it is open. The rest of the clauses
are standard from either intuitionistic or temporal logic, with the exception of ϕ. The
interpretation of the latter is due to Kremer, and we will discuss it further in the next
section.
As a general convention, we let structures inherit the properties of their components, so
that for example an Alexandroff model is a model A such that (|A|, TA) is an Alexandroff space.
In the setting of Alexandroff models, the semantics for implication simplifies somewhat.
Lemma 3.2. Let A be a model based on an Alexandroff space, and ϕ be any formula. Then,
(1) If TA = D4, x ∈ |A| and ϕ,ψ ∈ LI , then x ∈ Jϕ⇒ψKA if and only if, for all y 4 x, if
y ∈ JϕKA, then y ∈ JψKA.
(2) Similarly, if TA = U4, x ∈ |A| and ϕ,ψ ∈ LI , then x ∈ Jϕ⇒ψKA if and only if, for all
y < x, if y ∈ JϕKA, then y ∈ JψKA.
(3) JϕKA = ⋂n<ω f−n JϕKA .
Proof. For the first claim, observe that if x ∈ E ⊆ |A|, then x ∈ E◦ if and only if ↓x ⊆ E.
From this and the definition of Jϕ⇒ψKA, the claim follows. The second claim is analogous,
but replacing 4 by <. For the third, since infinite intersections of open sets are open in an
Alexandroff space, it follows that
⋂
n<ω f
−n JϕKA is open, and thusJϕKA = ( ⋂
n<ω
f−n JϕKA )◦ = ⋂
n<ω
f−n JϕKA .
Validity is then defined in the usual way:
Definition 3.3. Given a model X and a formula ϕ ∈ LI , we say that ϕ is valid on X,
written X |= ϕ, if JϕKX = |X|. If X is a dynamical system, we write X |= ϕ if (X, J·K) |= ϕ
for every valuation J·K on X. If Ω is a class of dynamical systems or models, we say that
ϕ ∈ LI is valid on Ω if, for every X ∈ Ω, X |= ϕ. If ϕ is not valid on Ω, it is falsifiable on Ω.
We define the logics ITLc♦ and ITL
c to be the set of formulas of LI♦ and LI , respectively,
that are valid over the class of all dynamical systems.
One of the key differences between classical and intuitionistic logic has to do with the
fact that any formula is classically equivalent to its double negation, but intuitionistically
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this need not be the case. To this end, it is convenient to elucidate the topological meaning
of double negation.
Lemma 3.4. Let X be any model and ϕ ∈ LI . Then, J∼∼ϕK = (JϕK)◦; that is, ∼∼ϕ is
true precisely on the interior of the closure of JϕK.
We leave the proof to the reader; it can be a good exercise to familiarize oneself with
the topological semantics of intuitionistic logic. As a corollary, we obtain the following fact,
which will be useful throughout the text: given formulas ϕ,ψ and a model X, we have that
X |= ϕ⇒∼∼ψ if and only if JψK is dense in JϕK; that is, if JϕK ⊆ JψK.
Example 3.5. Consider a model (R, f, J·K), where R is the real line equipped with the
standard topology, and JpK = (−1, 0) ∪ (0, 1); the value of f is unimportant for this example,
and we may take e.g. f(x) = x. Then, in view of Lemma 3.4,
J∼∼pK = ((−1, 0) ∪ (0, 1))◦ = [−1, 1]◦ = (−1, 1).
In particular, 0 6∈ J∼∼p⇒ pK, showing that the latter formula is not intuitionistically valid.
Next we exhibit a principle valid in Alexandroff systems that, as we will see later, is not
valid in general.
Example 3.6. The formula
∀(∼p ∨ ♦p)⇒ ∼♦p ∨ ♦p
is valid on any model based on an Alexandroff space. To see this, suppose that A is any
such model with TA = D4, and suppose that w ∈ J∀(∼p ∨ ♦p)KA, so that J∼p ∨ ♦pKA = |A|.
If w ∈ J∼♦pKA we are done, otherwise there is v 4 w such that v ∈ J♦pKA, from which we
obtain fnA(v) ∈ JpKA for some n.
Note that fnA(v) 4 fnA(w), from which it follows that fnA(w) 6∈ J∼pKA. But fnA(w) ∈J∼p ∨ ♦pKA, so that fnA(w) ∈ J♦pKA and thus fn+mA (w) ∈ JpKA for some m ≥ 0, which implies
that w ∈ J♦pKA, as required.
However, as we will see later, the above formula ϕ is not valid over the class of all
dynamical systems. Next, let us show that our full language can be simplified somewhat; in
particular, it admits ∃-elimination.
Lemma 3.7. Given any model X and any formula ϕ, J∃ϕKX = J∼∀∼ϕKX .
Proof. Note that J∃ϕKX ∈ {∅, |X|}. If J∃ϕKX = ∅, then JϕKX = ∅, and thus J∼ϕKX = |X|.
It follows that J∀∼ϕKX = |X|, and thus J∼∀∼ϕKX = ∅.
Otherwise, J∃ϕKX = |X|, which means that JϕKX 6= ∅. Hence J∼ϕKX 6= |X|; but then,J∀∼ϕKX = ∅, therefore J∼∀∼ϕKX = |X|.
Thus we may turn our attention to LI  {◦,♦,,∀}, or, generally speaking, to languages
without ∃; however, we do want ∃ to be definable, as it will allow us to capture minimality
(see §11.1). In contrast, if LI∃ denotes the ∀-free fragment LI  {◦,♦,, ∃}, then ∀ is not
LI∃-definable, as we will see next. Below, if X is any set, f : X → X and U ⊆ X, we say
that U is f-invariant if f(U) ⊆ U , and we say that two valuations J·K, J·K′ agree on U ifJpK ∩ U = JpK′ for all propositional variables p.
Lemma 3.8. Let X be a dynamical system and let J·K, J·K′ be two valuations on X that
agree on a dense, open, fX-invariant set U ⊆ |X|. Then JϕK ∩ U = JϕK′ ∩ U for all formulas
ϕ ∈ LI∃.
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Proof. The proof proceeds by a standard structural induction on ϕ. We treat only the cases
where ϕ is of the form ψ or ∃ψ as examples.
If x ∈ JψK, there is a neighbourhood V of x such that for all y ∈ V and n < ω,
fnX(y) ∈ JψK. Since U is open we may assume that V ⊆ U , in which case if y ∈ V and n < ω
we obtain fnX(y) ∈ U from the assumption that U is fX-invariant. Thus we may apply the
induction hypothesis to see that fnX(y) ∈ JψK′, so that V witnesses that x ∈ JψK′, as needed.
The converse implication is entirely symmetrical.
Finally, if ϕ = ∃ψ and x ∈ J∃ψK, then JψK 6= ∅. Since U is dense there is some
y ∈ JψK ∩ U , which by induction hypothesis gives us y ∈ JψK′ and thus x ∈ J∃ψK′.
From this it is straightforward to construct two models that agree on LI∃ but not on LI .
Proposition 3.9. There is no formula in LI∃ equivalent to ∀p over the class of finite,
invertible dynamical systems.
Proof. Let X = (W,D≤,1W ) where W = {0, 1}, 0 ≤ 1 and 1W is the identity function on
W . Let J·K, J·K′ be valuations so that JpK = W , JpK′ = {0} and JqK = JqK′ = ∅ for all q 6= p.
Then J·K and J·K′ agree on {0}, which is dense, open, and trivially 1W -invariant. It follows
that for all ϕ ∈ LI∃, 0 ∈ JϕK if and only if 0 ∈ JϕK′; however 0 ∈ J∀pK but 0 6∈ J∀pK′, so that
ϕ is not equivalent to ∀p.
Similarly, ♦ and  cannot be defined in terms of each other, even over the class of finite
dynamical systems [4], but we omit  from our language for technical reasons that will be
discussed later. Meanwhile, we have included ∀ in LI♦ but not ∃; since the latter is definable,
we lose nothing by omitting it.
4. Related Logics
Before we continue our analysis of ITLc♦, let us mention some related systems. First we
observe that ITLc is an extension of the logic ITLc introduced by Kremer in [30]. To be
precise, Kremer considers the language3 LI = LI  {◦,}. There he also presents the next
example, which will help elucidate the semantics of .
Example 4.1. Consider the dynamical system (R, f) where f : R→ R is given by
f(x) =
{
0 if x ≤ 0,
2x otherwise.
Suppose that JpK = (−∞, 1).
Observe that, for all n, fn(0) = 0 ∈ JpK. Thus 0 ∈ ⋂n<ω f−n JpK. Moreover, if x < 0,
then x ∈ JpK and f(x) = 0, so once again x ∈ ⋂n<ω f−n JpK.
On the other hand, if x > 0, then fn(x) = 2nx. Since 2n →∞ as n→∞ it follows that
2nx > 1 for n large enough, and thus fn(x) 6∈ JpK. It follows that x 6∈ ⋂n<ω f−n JpK. But
then ⋂
n<ω
f−n JpK = (−∞, 0],
3In order to match the presentation in [30], we do not include ∀ in LI. However, it is an inessential choice
for our purposes, and adding ∀ to LI would not affect our discussion.
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which is not open. Since intuitionistic truth values must always be open, we need to
“approximate” it by an open set; this is done in the standard way by taking the interior, and
thus JpK = ( ⋂
n<ω
f−n JpK )◦ = (−∞, 0).
Kremer used Example 4.1 in [30] to prove the that several key principles of LTL fail
intuitionistically.
Theorem 4.2. Let ITLR be the set of formulas of LI valid over the class of dynamical systems
based on R (with the usual topology). Then, p⇒◦p, ◦p⇒◦p, and p⇒p 6∈ ITLR.
This shows that some care must be taken when working with , and as we will discuss
in Example 5.4, the decidability proof we will present would not go through if we included it
(at least not without some non-trivial modifications). Note, however, that in view of Lemma
3.2, this issue disappears when working over the class of Alexandroff spaces.
Moreover, Alexandroff spaces will allow us to compare our semantics with the expanding
frames presented in Boudou et al. [10]. There, we use relational structures (W,4, f), where
w 4 v implies that f(w) 4 f(v), and let w ∈ W satisfy ϕ⇒ψ if, whenever v < w, if v
satisfies ϕ, it also satisfies ψ; note that these are precisely the truth conditions with respect to
the up-set topology U4. Structures with these properties are similar to expanding products
in modal logic [23], and we will denote the logic of such frames over LI♦ and LI by ITLe♦ and
ITLe, respectively. We proved in [10] that ITLe is decidable, with a similar super-exponential
bound as we will obtain for ITLc♦, although the techniques are quite different.
4 This is proven
by showing that ITLe has the effective finite model property; as we will see, the same does
not hold for ITLc♦, which is why we need to work instead with quasimodels (see §5).
In [10], we also consider frames with the additional ‘backward confluence’ property
4 ◦ f ⊆ f ◦ 4; these systems are also considered in [27], there called functional Kripke
frames. We will follow [10] and call them persistent frames, since they are related to standard
(persistent) products of modal logics [33]. The intuitionistic temporal logic of persistent
frames is denoted ITLp.
Backwards confluence may also be written as ↑f(w) ⊆ f [↑w]; in other words, f is an
open map. Hence, expanding frames are precisely the Alexandroff dynamical systems, and
persistent frames are the Alexandroff dynamical systems with an open map. It is immediate
that ITLc ⊆ ITLe ⊆ ITLp; in fact, both inclusions are strict. In Balbiani et al. [4] it is shown
that (◦p⇒◦q)⇒◦(p⇒ q) ∈ ITLp \ ITLe, and later we will show that ITLc♦ 6= ITLe♦.
Finally, it will be convenient to compare ITLc to dynamic topological logic. Since the
latter’s base logic is classical, we may use a simpler syntax for DTL, using the language LC
given by the grammar
⊥ | p | ϕ→ ψ | ϕ | ◦ϕ | ϕ | ∀ϕ.
We can then define ¬,∧,∨,,♦ using standard classical validities. Since we will go back
and forth between the classical and intuitionistic interpertations, we will always use ¬,→
for classical logics and ∼,⇒ for intuitionistic ones to avoid confusion.
4Note that in [10] we do not include a universal modality, but the proof of decidability can be readily
modified to accommodate it.
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Language Connectives Modalities
LI ⊥,∨,∧,⇒ ◦,♦,, ∃, ∀
LI♦ ⊥,∨,∧,⇒ ◦,♦, ∀
LI ⊥,∨,∧,⇒ ◦,
LI∃ ⊥,∨,∧,⇒ ◦,♦,,∃
LC ⊥,→ , ◦,,∀
Table 1: Formal languages considered in the text. Note that, in order to simplify notation,
we indicate at most one distinctive modality.
Given a dynamical system X, a classical valuation on X is a function J·KC : LC → P(|X|)
such thatJ⊥KC = ∅ Jϕ→ ψKC = (|X| \ JϕKC) ∪ JψKCJϕKC = (JϕKC)◦ J◦ϕKC = f−1X JϕKCJϕKC = ⋂
n<ω
f−nX JϕKC J∀ϕKC = |X| if JϕKC = |X| and ∅ otherwise.
Note that valuations of formulas are no longer restricted to open sets. Our intuitionistic
temporal logic may then be interpreted in DTL via the Go¨del-Tarski translation ·, defined
as follows:
Definition 4.3. Given ϕ ∈ LI , we define ϕ ∈ LC recursively by setting
⊥ = ⊥ p = p
(ϕ ψ) = ϕ  ψ (ϕ⇒ψ) = (ϕ → ψ)
(ϕ) = ϕ (ϕ) = ϕ,
where  ∈ {∧,∨} and  ∈ {◦,♦, ∃,∀}.
For example,
(♦p⇒⊥) = (♦p→ ⊥).
The following can then be verified by a simple induction on ϕ:
Lemma 4.4. Let ϕ ∈ LI , and X be any dynamic topological system. Suppose that J·K
is an intuitionistic valuation and J·KC a classical valuation such that, for every atom p,
(JpKC)◦ = JpK. Then, for every formula ϕ, JϕK = qϕyC .
From Lemma 4.4 and the fact that DTL is computably enumerable [18], we immediately
obtain the following.
Theorem 4.5. The logic ITLc is computably enumerable.
Note that [18] considers a language without a universal modality, but adding it does
not affect computable enumerability. Moreover, we proved in [19] that any satisfiable LC
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formula was also satisfiable on a model based on Q; as before, the universal modality can
readily be incorporated, giving us the following:
Theorem 4.6. Let ITLQ be the set of LI-formulas that are valid over the class of dynamical
systems based on the rational numbers with the usual topology. Then, ITLQ = ITLc.
However, DTL is undecidable [28], and hence Theorem 4.5 does not settle the decidability
of ITLc. It is not known whether the full ITLc is decidable; however, in the rest of this article
we will show that this is indeed the case for ITLc♦.
5. Labelled Systems
Our decidability proof is based on (non-deterministic) quasimodels, introduced in [18]. In this
section we will introduce labeled systems, which generalize both quasimodels and dynamical
topological models, thus allowing us to view both of them in a unified framework. Given a
set Σ ⊂ LI♦ that is closed under subformulas, we say that Φ ⊆ Σ is a Σ-type if the following
occur.
(1) ⊥ 6∈ Σ.
(2) If ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Σ, then ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Φ if and only if ϕ,ψ ∈ Φ.
(3) If ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Σ, then ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Φ if and only if ϕ ∈ Ψ or ψ ∈ Φ.
(4) If ϕ⇒ψ ∈ Σ, then
(a) ϕ⇒ψ ∈ Φ implies that ϕ 6∈ Φ or ψ ∈ Φ and
(b) ψ ∈ Φ implies that ϕ⇒ψ ∈ Φ.
(5) If ♦ψ ∈ Σ and ψ ∈ Φ, then ♦ψ ∈ Φ.
The set of Σ-types will be denoted by TΣ. Many times we want Σ to be finite, in which case
given ∆ ⊆ LI♦ we write Σ b ∆ to indicate that Σ ⊆ ∆ is finite and closed under subformulas.
Note that TΣ is partially ordered by ⊆, and we will endow it with the up-set topology U⊆.
For Φ ∈ TΣ, say that a formula ϕ⇒ψ ∈ Σ is a defect of Φ if ϕ⇒ψ 6∈ Φ and ϕ 6∈ Φ. The set
of defects of Φ will be denoted ∂ΣΦ, or simply ∂Φ when Σ is clear from context.
Definition 5.1. Let Σ ⊂ LI♦ be closed under subformulas. We say that a Σ-labeled space
is a triple W = (|W|, TW, `W), where (|W|, TW) is a topological space and `W : |W| → TΣ
a continuous function such that for all w ∈ |W|, whenever ϕ⇒ψ ∈ ∂`W(w) and U is any
neighborhood of w, there is v ∈ U such that ϕ ∈ `W(v) and ψ 6∈ `W(v). Such a v revokes
ϕ⇒ψ.
The Σ-labeled space W falsifies ϕ ∈ L if ϕ ∈ Σ \ `W(w) for some w ∈ |W|, and `W is
honest if, for every w ∈ |W| and every ∀ϕ ∈ Σ, we have that ∀ϕ ∈ `W(w) if and only if
ϕ ∈ `W(v) for every v ∈ |W|.
If W is a labelled space, elements of |W| will sometimes be called worlds. As usual, we
may write ` instead of `W when this does not lead to confusion. Since we have endowed
TΣ with the topology U⊆, the continuity of ` means that for every w ∈ |W|, there is a
neighborhood U of w such that, whenever v ∈ U , `W(w) ⊆ `W(v).
Note that not every subset U of |W| gives rise to a substructure that is also a labelled
space; however, this is the case when U is open.
Lemma 5.2. If Σ ⊆ LI♦ is closed under subformulas, W is a Σ-labelled space, and U ⊆ |W|
is open, then W  U is a Σ-labelled space.
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Figure 1: If (A,4) is a partial order and S ⊆ A×A, then S is continuous with respect to
the down-set topology D4 whenever the above diagram can always be completed.
For our purposes, a continuous relation on a topological space is a relation under which
the preimage of any open set is open (note that this is not the standard definition of a
contiuous relation, which is more involved). In the context of an Alexandroff space with
the down-set topology, a continuous relation S is one that satisfies the forward confluence
property depicted in Figure 1: if w′ 4 w S v, then there is v′ such that w′ S v′ 4 v.
Definition 5.3. Let Σ ⊂ LI♦ be closed under subformulas. Suppose that Φ,Ψ ∈ TΣ. The
ordered pair (Φ,Ψ) is sensible if
(1) for all ◦ϕ ∈ Σ, ◦ϕ ∈ Φ if and only if ϕ ∈ Ψ,
(2) for all ♦ϕ ∈ Σ, ♦ϕ ∈ Φ if and only if ϕ ∈ Φ or ♦ϕ ∈ Ψ, and
(3) for all ∀ϕ ∈ Σ, ∀ϕ ∈ Φ if and only if ∀ϕ ∈ Ψ.
Likewise, a pair (w, v) of worlds in a labelled space W is sensible if (`(w), `(v)) is sensible.
A continuous relation S ⊆ |W| × |W| is sensible if every pair in S is sensible. Further, S is
ω-sensible if it is serial and, whenever ♦ϕ ∈ `(w), there are n ≥ 0 and v such that w Sn v
and ϕ ∈ `(v).
A labelled system is a labelled space W equipped with a sensible relation SW ⊆ |W|×|W|;
if moreover `W is honest and SW is ω-sensible, we say that W is a well Σ-labelled system.
Any dynamic topological model can be regarded as a well-labelled system. If Σ ⊆ LI♦
is closed under subformulas, X is a model and x ∈ |X|, we can assign a Σ-type `X(x) to x
given by
`X(x) = {ψ ∈ Σ : x ∈ JψKX} .
We also set SX = fX; it is obvious that `X is honest and SX is ω-sensible. Henceforth we will
tacitly identify X by its associated well LI♦-labelled system.
Example 5.4. Example 4.1 can be used to show that there are some difficulties when treating
 using labelled systems. In that example JpK = (−∞, 0), so that, for instance, −1 ∈ JpK,
but f(−1) = 0 6∈ JpK. If we wanted to label our model using Σ = {p,p}, we would have to
set `(−1) = {p,p} and `(0) = {p}. Nevertheless, by the semantics of p, we know that
fn(0) ∈ JpK for all n < ω, yet this information is not recorded in `(0).
We could get around this issue by using the classical semantics and the Go¨del-Tarski
translation, where (p) = p. If we use Σ = sub(p), we would have p ∈
`(−1), but also p ∈ `(−1) and hence p ∈ `(0). With this, 0 would ‘remember’ that all
of its temporal successors must satisfy p. However, note that p 6∈ `(x) for any x > 0,
and hence ` is no longer continuous. This is a problem for us, since the continuity of ` is
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Figure 2: A non-deterministic quasimodel.
used in an essential way (for example, in the proof of Lemma 9.7) to bound the size of our
quasimodels.
Another useful class of labelled systems is given by quasimodels:
Definition 5.5. Given Σ b LI♦, a weak Σ-quasimodel is a Σ-labelled system Q such that
TQ is equal to the down-set topology for a partial order which we denote 4Q. If moreover Q
is a well Σ-labelled system, then we say that Q is a Σ-quasimodel.
Example 5.6. Recall from Example 3.6 that the formula
ϕ = ∀(∼p ∨ ♦p)⇒∼♦p ∨ ♦p
is valid on any Alexandroff dynamical model. However, Figure 2 exhibits a quasimodel5
falsifying ϕ. Let θ = ∼♦p ∨ ♦p, and define ` by
`(u) = {∀(∼p∨ ♦p), (∼p∨ ♦p),∼p}
`(v) = {♦p,∼p, (∼p∨ ♦p), ϕ, θ, ∀(∼p ∨ ♦p)}
`(w) = {p, (∼p∨ ♦p), ϕ, θ, ∀(∼p ∨ ♦p),♦p}.
We include the full labels for completeness, but the most relevant formulas are displayed in
boldface. In particular, observe that p belongs only to `(w), and ϕ 6∈ `(u); the latter means
that u falsifies ϕ, and thus ϕ is not valid over the class of sub(ϕ)-quasimodels. As we will
see, this implies that ϕ is not valid over the class of dynamical systems.
6. Producing Dynamic Topological Models from Quasimodels
Note that if Q is a quasimodel, then SQ is not necessarily a function, and thus we may
not view Q directly as a dynamical topological model. However, we can extract a model ~Q
from it via an unwinding construction, and we call the resulting structure the limit model of
Q. The general idea is to consider infinite ‘deterministic’ paths on Q as points in the limit
model; however, we will only keep those paths ~w with the property that, if ♦ϕ occurs in ~w,
then ϕ must also occur at a later time. These are the realizing paths of Q.
5Compare to [18], where we use a very similar quasimodel to falsify the formula ψ = p→ p, also
valid over Alexandroff systems. Note, however, that this ψ uses the classical semantics and thus we use a
slightly more complicated example here.
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6.1. Realizing paths. A path in a quasimodel Q is any finite sequence (wn)n<α with α ≤ ω
such that wn S wn+1 whenever n+ 1 < α. An infinite path ~w = (wn)n<ω is realizing if for
all n < ω and ♦ψ ∈ `(wn), there exists k ≥ n such that ψ ∈ `(wk).
Denote the set of realizing paths by |~Q|. This will be the domain of the limit model
of Q. The transition function on |~Q| will be the ‘shift’ operator, defined by ~S((wn)n<ω) =
(wn+1)n<ω . This simply removes the first element in the sequence.
For our construction to work we must guarantee that there are ‘enough’ realizing paths.
The following definition makes this precise:
Definition 6.1. Let Σ b LI♦, Q be a Σ-quasimodel, and E ⊆ |~Q|. Then, E is extensive if
(1) E is closed under ~S, and
(2) any finite path (w0, w1, .., wm) in Q can be extended to an (infinite) realizing path
~w = (wi)i<ω ∈ E.
Lemma 6.2. Let Σ be a finite set of formulas closed under subformulas. If Q is a Σ-
quasimodel, then |~Q| is extensive.
Proof. It is obvious that |~Q| is closed under ~S, so we focus on (2). Let (wi)i≤m be a finite
path and (ψi)i<n be all formulas such that ♦ψi ∈ `(wm) (so that n = 0 if there are no such
ψi’s). Let k0 = 0 and suppose inductively that we have constructed a path
(w0, . . . , wm, . . . , wm+ki)
such that, for all j ∈ [1, i), ψj ∈ `(wt) for some t ∈ [m,m+ki]. Because S = SQ is ω-sensible,
if ♦ψi ∈ `(wm+ki), we know that there exist k′i ≥ 0 and vi ∈ Sk
′
i(wm+ki) such that ψi ∈ `(vi);
otherwise, set k′i = 0 and vi = wm+ki . We then define ki+1 = ki + k
′
i and choose
wm+ki S wm+ki+1 S . . . S wm+ki+1 = vi.
Repeating this process, we obtain a path
(w0, ..., wm, wm+1 . . . wm+kn)
realizing all ♦ψ ∈ `(wm). Note that we may have kn = 0 (for example, if n = 0), in which
case we choose arbitrary wm+1 such that wm S wm+1, using the seriality of S. We then
repeat the process beginning with (w0, ..., wm+kn), and continue countably many times until
an infinite realizing path is formed.
If A is an Alexandroff model and v 4 w, then for all i < ω we also have that f iA(v) 4
f iA(w), and moreover
(
f iA(v)
)
i<ω
is a realizing path. However, this does not always hold
when we replace fA by a non-deterministic relation: if Q is a quasimodel, (wi)i<ω is a
realizing path, and v0 4 w0, it may be that we cannot ‘complete’ v0 to a realizing path
~v = (vi)i<ω so that vi 4 wi for all i. Fortunately, we do not need such a path in our limit
model; it is sufficient to ‘approximate’ it by producing paths ~v so that vi 4 wi for all i < n,
provided n can be taken arbitrarily large. The next lemma will help us do this. We omit
the proof, which follows by an easy induction using the continuity of SQ.
Lemma 6.3. Let Q be a Σ-quasimodel, (wi)i≤n a finite path, and v0 be such that v0 4 w0.
Then, there exists a path (vi)i≤n such that, for i ≤ n, vi 4 wi.
In fact, the path ~v of Lemma 6.3 can be used to approximate an infinite path ~w in a
rather precise way; to formalize this, we need to endow |~Q| with a topology.
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6.2. Limit models. If Σ b LI♦ and Q is a Σ-quasimodel, the relation 4 = 4Q induces a
topology on |Q|, as we have seen before, by letting open sets be those which are downwards
closed under 4. Likewise, 4 induces a very different topology on |~Q|, in a rather natural
way:
Lemma 6.4. For each ~w ∈ |~Q| and n < ω, define
↓n ~w =
{
(vi)i<ω ∈ |~Q| : ∀i ≤ n, vi 4 wi
}
.
Then, the set B4 =
{↓n ~w : ~w ∈ |~Q|, n < ω} forms a topological basis on |~Q|.
Proof. To check that it satisfies 2.2.1, note that it is obvious that, given any path ~w ∈ |~Q|,
there is a basic set containing it (say, ↓0 ~w), and hence |~Q| =
⋃
~w∈|~Q| ↓0 ~w. As for 2.2.2,
assuming that ~w ∈ ↓n~u ∩ ↓m~v, we observe that ↓max(n,m) ~w ⊆ ↓n~u ∩ ↓m~v, as needed.
Definition 6.5. The topology ~T4 on |~Q| is the topology generated by the basis B4.
Now that we have equipped the set of realizing paths with a topology, we need a
continuous transition function on it to have a dynamical system. Our ‘shift’ operator ~S will
do the trick.
Lemma 6.6. The function ~S : |~Q| → |~Q| is continuous under the topology ~T4.
Proof. Let ~w = (wi)i<ω be a realizing path and ↓n~S(~w) be a neighborhood of ~S(~w). Then,
if ~v ∈ ↓n+1 ~w, wi 4 vi for all i ≤ n + 1, so wi+1 4 vi+1 for all i ≤ n and ~S(~v) ∈ ↓n~S(~w).
Hence ~S(↓n+1 ~w) ⊆ ↓n~S(~w), and ~S is continuous.
Finally, we will use ` to define a valuation: if p is a propositional variable, setJpK` = {~w ∈ |~Q| : p ∈ `(w0)}.
With this, we are now ready to assign a dynamic topological model to each quasimodel:
Definition 6.7. Given a Σ-quasimodel Q, define
~Q =
(
|~Q|, ~T4, ~S, J·K` )
to be the limit model of Q.
Of course this model is only useful if J·K` matches with ` on all formulas of Σ, not just
propositional variables. Fortunately, this turns out to be the case.
Lemma 6.8. Let Σ b LI♦, Q be a Σ-quasimodel, ~w = (wn)n<ω ∈ |~Q| and ϕ ∈ Σ. Then,JϕK` = {~w : ϕ ∈ `(w0)}.
Proof. The proof goes by standard induction of formulas. The induction steps for ∧,∨ are
immediate; here we will only treat the cases for ⇒, ◦,♦,.
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Case 1: ϕ = ψ⇒ θ. If ϕ ∈ `(w0), take the neighborhood ↓0w0 of ~w and consider ~v ∈ ↓0w0,
so that v0 4 w0. Since Q is a Σ-labelled space, it follows that, if ψ ∈ `(v0), then θ ∈ `(v0);
by the induction hypothesis, this means that if ~v ∈ JψK`, then ~v ∈ JθK`. Since ~v ∈ ↓0w0 was
arbitrary, we conclude that ~w ∈ Jψ⇒ θK`.
On the other hand, if ψ⇒ θ 6∈ `(w0), there is v0 4 w0 such that ψ ∈ `(v0) but θ 6∈ `(v0).
Consider any basic neighborhood ↓n ~w of ~w. Then, by Lemma 6.3, there exists a path
(v0, ..., vn) ⊆ |Q| such that, for all i ≤ n, vi 4 wi and for i < n, vi S vi+1. Because |~Q|
is extensive, (vi)i≤n can be extended to a realizing path ~v ∈ |~Q|. Then, ~v ∈ ↓n ~w, and by
induction hypothesis ~v ∈ JϕK` \ JθK` . Since n was arbitrary, we conclude that ~w 6∈ Jψ⇒ θK` .
Case 2: ϕ = ◦ψ. This case follows from the fact that (w0, w1) is sensible and the induction
hypothesis.
Case 3: ϕ = ♦ψ. Because ~w is a realizing path, if ♦ψ ∈ `(w0), then ψ ∈ `(wn) for some n ≥ 0.
We can use the induction hypothesis to conclude that ~Sn(~w) ∈ JψK`, and so ~w ∈ J♦ψK`.
For the other direction, assume that ♦ψ 6∈ `(w0). For all n, (wn, wn+1) is sensible so an
easy induction shows that ψ 6∈ `(wn), so that by the induction hypothesis ~Sn(~w) 6∈ JψK` ;
since n was arbitrary, ~w 6∈ J♦ψK` .
Case 4: ϕ = ∀ψ. If ∀ψ ∈ `(w0), then since ` is honest, we can use the induction hypothesis
to conclude that ~v ∈ JψK` for all ~v ∈ |~Q|, and thus ~w ∈ J∀ψK`. If ∀ψ 6∈ `(w0), there is
v0 ∈ |Q| such that ψ 6∈ `(v0). We can extend v0 to a realizing path ~v and, by the induction
hypothesis, ~v 6∈ JψK`, hence ~w 6∈ J∀ψK`.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section, which in particular implies
that ITLc♦ is sound for the class of quasimodels.
Proposition 6.9. Let Σ b LI♦ and Q be any quasimodel. Then, ~Q is a model, and for all
ϕ ∈ Σ we have that ~Q falsifies ϕ if and only if Q falsifies ϕ.
Proof. It is clear from its definition that ~S is a function and by Lemma 6.6 it is continuous,
so that (|~Q|, ~T4, ~S) is a dynamical system. Now, suppose that w0 ∈ |Q| is such that
ϕ ∈ Σ \ `(w0). By Lemma 6.2, w0 can be extended to a realizing path ~w. It follows from
Lemma 6.8 that ~w 6∈ JϕK` , and therefore ϕ is falsified on ~Q. Conversely, if ~w = (wi)i<ω ∈ |~Q|
falsifies ϕ then ϕ 6∈ `(w0), so that Q falsifies ϕ if and only if ~Q does.
Example 6.10. Recall from Examples 3.6 and 5.6 that the formula
ϕ = ∀(∼p ∨ ♦p)⇒∼♦p ∨ ♦p (6.1)
is valid over the class of Alexandroff systems, but is falsifiable in a finite quasimodel. Thus
it follows from Proposition 6.9 that ϕ is also falsifiable in a dynamical topological model.
It is instructive to construct such a model directly, rather than appealing to the theorem.
To this end, let us refute ϕ on R. Define f : R→ R by f(x) = 2x, and JpK = (1,∞). Then
it is not hard to check that J∼pK = (−∞, 1) and J♦pK = (0,∞), so that J∀(∼p ∨ ♦p)K = R.
On the other hand J∼♦pK = (−∞, 0), so that 0 6∈ J∼♦p ∨ ♦pK and ϕ is not valid on R.
In view of Example 3.6, we conclude that ITLc♦ ( ITLe♦. Note however that not every
falsifiable formula is falsifiable on R, given that the latter is connected, in the following
sense:
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Definition 6.11. A topological space X is disconnected if there are non-empty, disjoint
open sets A,B ⊆ |X| such that A ∪B = |X|; otherwise, X is connected.
It is well-known that Rn is connected for any n < ω. As noted by Shehtman, the formula
∀(p ∨ ∼p)⇒(∀p ∨ ∀∼p) (6.2)
is valid over the class of connected spaces [40], from which the validity of ϕ for systems
based on a connected space is a straightforward consequence.
7. Moments
We have seen that any valid ϕ ∈ Σ is valid over the class of Σ-quasimodels. The converse
is true, and for this we need to construct, given a model X falsifying ϕ, a quasimodel also
falsifying ϕ. This quasimodel will be denoted X/Σ. The worlds of X/Σ will be called
Σ-moments; the intuition is that a Σ-moment represents all the information that holds at
the same ‘moment of time’.
Definition 7.1. A Σ-moment is a Σ-labelled space w such that Tw is the down-set topology
of a partial order 4w, and (|w|,4w) is a finite tree with (unique) root rw. We will write
`Σ(w) instead of `w(rw). The set of Σ-moments is denoted MΣ.
Definition 7.2. Let w be a Σ-moment. For w ∈ |w|, let w[w] = w  ↓w, i.e.,
w[w] =
( ↓w , 4w  ↓w , `w  ↓w ).
We write w 4Σ v if v = w[w] for some w ∈ |w|.
We now wish to define a weak Σ-quasimodel MΣ over MΣ. For this, it remains to define
a sensible relation on MΣ.
Definition 7.3. Say w is a temporal successor of v, denoted v SΣ w, if there exists a
sensible relation R ⊆ |v| × |w| such that rv R rw.
Lemma 7.4. Let Σ b LI♦ and w,w′, v ∈MΣ.
(1) If w SΣ v then (`Σ(w), `Σ(v)) is sensible.
(2) If w′ 4Σ w SΣ v, there is v′ 4Σ v such that w′ SΣ v′.
Proof. Suppose that w SΣ v, and let R ⊆ |v| × |w| be a sensible relation such that rv R
rw. Then, the pair (`w(rw), `v(rv)) is sensible because R is sensible, but it is equal to
(`Σ(w), `Σ(v)), as needed for the first claim.
For the second, suppose further that w′ 4Σ w. This means that w′ = w[w] for some
w ∈ |w|. Since R is sensible and |v| is open, R−1|v| is open as well, meaning in particular
that w R v for some v ∈ |v|. Now consider R′ = R ∩ (↓w × ↓ v). Since ↓ v is open it follows
that R′ is continuous as well, and every pair in R′ is sensible since every pair in R was.
Moreover, rw[w] = w R
′ v = rv[v]. Thus R′ witnesses that w′ = w[w] SΣ v[v] 4Σ v, as
needed.
Lemma 7.4.2 essentially says that SΣ is a continuous relation with respect to the down-set
topology induced by 4Σ (see Figure 1). With this, we are ready to define our ‘canonical’
weak quasimodels.
Definition 7.5. Let Σ b LI♦. Define MΣ to be the set of all finite Σ-moments, and set
MΣ = (MΣ,4Σ, SΣ, `Σ).
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Φ
u0 u1 u2
Figure 3: The moment
[
Φ
U
]
, where U = {u0, u1, u2} and Φ ⊆ Σ b LI♦.
Lemma 7.6. If Σ b LI♦, then MΣ is a weak quasimodel.
Proof. That SΣ is sensible is Lemma 7.4, so it remains to show that (MΣ,4Σ, `Σ) is a
Σ-labelled space. First we check that `Σ is continuous. This amounts to showing that,
if w <Σ v ∈ MΣ, then `Σ(w) ⊆ `Σ(v). But, w <Σ v means that v = w[v] for some
v 4w rw, hence `Σ(v) = `w(v) ⊇ `w(rw) = `Σ(w) by the continuity of `w. Similarly, if
δ = (ϕ⇒ψ) ∈ ∂`Σ(w), then there is v 4w rw such that v revokes δ; but then, w[v] 4Σ w
and w[v] revokes δ.
Henceforth, we may write 4, S, ` instead of 4Σ, SΣ, `Σ when this does not lead to
confusion. Observe that SΣ is not necessarily ω-sensible, and `Σ is not necessarily honest,
so MΣ is not a quasimodel as it stands. It does, however, contain substructures which are
proper quasimodels, as we will see later.
7.1. Building moments from smaller moments. Often we will want to construct a
Σ-moment from smaller moments. Here we will define the basic operation we will use to do
this, and establish the conditions that the pieces must satisfy. Below,
∐
denotes a disjoint
union.
Definition 7.7. Let ϕ be a formula of ITLc♦, Σ b LI♦, Φ ∈ TΣ and U ⊆MΣ.
Define w =
[
Φ
U
]
by setting
|w| = {Φ} ∪
∐
u∈U
|u|,
4w =
({Φ} × |w|) ∪∐
u∈U
4u,
`w(v) = {(Φ,Φ)} ∪
∐
u∈U
`u(v).
Note that
[
Φ
U
]
will not always be a moment, since `[ΦU]
thus defined might not be
continuous, or it might not revoke some defect. To ensure that we do obtain a new moment,
we need for (Φ, U) to be a kit.
Definition 7.8. Fix Σ b LI♦.
(1) A Σ-kit is a pair (Φ, U), with Φ ∈ TΣ and U ⊆MΣ finite, such that
(a) Φ ⊆ `(u) for all u ∈ U , and
(b) whenever ϕ⇒ψ ∈ ∂Φ, there is u ∈ U such that ϕ⇒ψ 6∈ `(u).
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(2) If w ∈MΣ, we say that the Σ-kit (Φ, U) is a successor kit for w if
(a) the pair (`(w),Φ) is sensible, and
(b) if v ≺ w, there is u ∈ U such that v SΣ u.
Lemma 7.9. Let Σ b LI♦, Φ ⊆ Σ, and V ⊆MΣ.
Then,
(1)
[
Φ
V
]
is a Σ-moment if and only if (Φ, V ) is a Σ-kit, and
(2)
[
Φ
V
]
is a Σ-moment with w SΣ
[
Φ
V
]
whenever (Φ, V ) is a successor kit for w.
Proof. To prove (1), one can check that the conditions for being a Σ-kit correspond exactly
to the conditions in Definition 5.1. For (2), let w1, . . . , wn enumerate the set |w| \ {rw}, and
for i ≤ n, let wi = w[wi]. For i ≤ n, let vi ∈ V be such that wi SΣ vi, and Ri ⊆ |wi| × |vi|
be sensible. Then, define R ⊆ |v| ×
∣∣∣[ΦV ]∣∣∣ by w R v if and only if (a) w = rw and v = rv,
or (b) w ∈ |wi|, v ∈ |vi| and w Ri v. It is readily seen that the relation R thus defined is
sensible.
8. Simulations
In order to prove that every falsifiable formula is falsifiable in a quasimodel, we need to rep-
resent dynamical models using quasimodels. Simulations are relations between quasimodels
and models (or labelled spaces in general), and provide the basic tools we need to achieve
such a representation.
Definition 8.1. Let Σ ⊆ ∆ ⊆ LI♦ both be closed under subformulas, X be a Σ-labelled space
and Y be a ∆-labelled space. A continuous relation χ ⊆ |X| × |Y| is a simulation if, for all
(x, y) ∈ χ, `X(x) = `Y(y) ∩ Σ.
We will call the latter property label-preservation. Note that it may be that `X is
honest while `Y is not, or vice-versa. However, this cannot happen with a total, surjective
simulation:
Lemma 8.2. Suppose that Σ ⊆ ∆ ⊆ LI♦ are both closed under subformulas, X is a Σ-labelled
space, Y is a ∆-labelled space, and χ ⊆ |X| × |Y| is a total, surjective simulation. Then, if
`Y is honest, it follows that `X is honest as well.
We omit the proof, which is straightforward; note that if Σ = ∆ then the last line
becomes an equivalence. Simulations are useful for comparing the purely topological behavior
of labelled structures. However, to compare their dynamic behavior, we need something a
bit stronger.
Definition 8.3. Let X and Y be labelled systems. A dynamic simulation between X and Y
is a simulation χ ⊆ |X| × |Y| such that SYχ ⊆ χSX.
The following properties are readily verified:
Lemma 8.4. Let X,Y,Z be labelled systems and χ ⊆ |X|× |Y|, ξ ⊆ |Y|× |Z| be simulations.
Then:
(1) ξχ ⊆ |X| × |Z| is a simulation. Moreover, if both χ and ξ are dynamic, then so is ξχ.
(2) If U ⊆ |X| and V ⊆ |Y| are open, then χ  U × V is a simulation.
(3) If Ξ ⊆ P(|X| × |Y|) is a set of simulations, then ⋃Ξ is also a simulation.
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y0
SY
y1
x0
SX
χ
x1
χ
Figure 4: The above diagram can always be completed if χ ⊆ |X| × |Y| is a dynamic
simulation.
If χ is a dynamic simulation between a weak quasimodel W and a dynamical model X,
it does not immediately follow that SW is ω-sensible. However, we can use the simulation χ
to extract an ω-sensible substructure from W.
Lemma 8.5. Let W, V be labelled systems and χ ⊆ |W| × |V| be a dynamical simulation.
Then, if SV is ω-sensible, it follows that SW  χ−1(|V|) is also ω-sensible.
Proof. Let w ∈ χ−1(|V|) and ♦ϕ ∈ `W(w). Since w ∈ χ−1(|V|), we can choose v0 ∈ |V| such
that w χ v0. Since ♦ϕ ∈ `W(w), it follows that ♦ϕ ∈ `V(v). Using the assumption that SV
is ω-sensible, we may choose a sequence
v0 SV v1 SV v2 SV . . . SV vn
such that ϕ ∈ `V(vn). Since χ is a dynamic simulation, we may recursively find
w = w0 SW w1 SW w2 SW . . . SW wn
such that wi χ vi for each i ≤ n. Then ϕ ∈ `W(wn), as needed.
The seriality of SW  χ−1(|V|) is verified similarly, using the seriality of SV.
Suppose in particular that X is a model and x∗ ∈ |X| falsifies ϕ ∈ Σ. Then, if Q is a
weak Σ-quasimodel and χ ⊆ |Q| × |X| is a surjective dynamical simulation such that w∗ χ x∗
for some w∗ ∈ |Q|, it follows Q  χ−1(|X|) is a quasimodel falsifying ϕ. Thus our strategy
will be to show that there is a weak Σ-quasimodel Q such that, given any dynamical model
X, there is a surjective dynamical simulation χ ⊆ |Q| × |X|. In principle we could take
Q = MΣ, but since we wish to obtain finite quasimodels, it will be convenient to consider a
finite substructure of MΣ. The elements of this structure will be the irreducible Σ-moments,
as defined in the next section.
9. Irreducible Moments
In order to obtain finite quasimodels, we will restrict MΣ to moments that are, in a sense,
no bigger than they need to be. To be precise, we want them to be minimal with respect to
E, which we define below, along with some other useful relations between moments.
Definition 9.1. Let Σ b LI♦ and w, v be Σ-moments. We write
(1) w ∼= v if w, v are isomorphic;
(2) w v v if |w| ⊆ |v|, 4w = 4v |w|, and `w = `v  |w|;
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(3) w E v if w v v and there is a continuous, surjective function pi : |v| → |w| such that
`v(v) = `w(pi(v)) for all v ∈ |v| and pi2 = pi. We say that w is a reduct of v and pi is a
reduction.
Note that the condition pi2 = pi is equivalent to requiring pi(w) = w whenever w ∈ |w|.
Lemma 9.2. Let Σ b LI♦ and w,w′, v, v′, u ∈MΣ.
(1) If w E v, then `(w) = `(v).
(2) If w E v and w ∈ |w|, then w[w] E v[w].
(3) If w E v E u, then w E u.
(4) If w SΣ v, w
′ E w and v′ E v, then w′ SΣ v′.
Proof.
(1) Let pi : |v| → |w| be a reduction. Observe that rw = pi(rv), since rw 4 rv implies that
rw = pi(rw) 4 pi(rv), but pi(rv) 4 rw since it is the root so that the two are equal. It
follows that `(w) = `w(pi(rv)) = `v(rv) = `(v).
(2) Let pi : |v| → |w| be a reduction. Then, (pi  ↓w) : ↓w → ↓w is label-preserving,
continuous and idempotent. It follows that w[w] E v[w].
(3) Let pi : |v| → |w| and ρ : |u| → |v| be reductions. Then, piρ is continuous, surjective,
label-preserving, and if w ∈ |w|, piρ(w) = pi(w) = w.
(4) Let R ⊆ |w| × |v| be sensible, ι : |w′| → |w| be the inclusion map, and pi : |v| → |v′| be a
reduction. Then, one readily checks that piRι ⊆ |w′| × |v′| is sensible.
Irreducible moments are the minimal moments under E. Let us define them formally
and establish their basic properties. Below, recall that v ≺1 w means that v ≺ w, and there
is no u such that v ≺ u ≺ w.
Definition 9.3. A moment w is irreducible if whenever w E v, it follows that w = v.
Lemma 9.4. Let Σ b LI♦.
(1) If w is any Σ-moment, there is v E w such that v is irreducible.
(2) If w is irreducible and v 4 w, then v is irreducible.
(3) If w is irreducible, u, v ≺1 rw and w[u] ∼= w[v], then u = v.
Proof.
(1) Choose v E w such that #|v| is minimal. Then, if u E v, it follows that #|u| ≤ #|v|
and, by Lemma 9.2.3, u E w; hence by minimality, #|u| = #|v|, and thus u = v. Since u
was arbitrary, v is irreducible.
(2) If v 4 w, then v = w[w] for some w ∈ |w|. Let pi : ↓ → ↓w be a reduction, and define
ρ : |w| → |w| by ρ(v) = pi(v) if v 4 w, ρ(v) = v otherwise. It is readily checked that ρ
is a reduction, and since w is irreducible, it must be surjective. However, this is only
possible if pi was already surjective.
(3) Assuming otherwise, let h : |w[u]| → |w[v]| be an isomorphism; then, define pi : |w| → |w|
by pi(x) = h(x) if x ∈ |w[u]|, pi(x) = x otherwise. It is readily checked that pi is a
reduction onto a strictly smaller moment.
The set of irreducible moments forms a weak quasimodel, much like the set of moments
MΣ.
Definition 9.5. Let Σ b LI♦. Define IΣ to be the set of all irreducible Σ-moments, and set
IΣ = MΣ  IΣ.
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Let us write w E0 v if w E v and v is irreducible. Then we have:
Lemma 9.6. Let Σ b LI♦. Then,
(1) IΣ is a weak Σ-quasimodel, and
(2) E0 ⊆ |IΣ| × |MΣ| is a surjective, dynamic simulation.
Proof. It is immediate from Lemma 9.4.2 that IΣ is open, and thus IΣ is a weak quasimodel
by Lemma 5.2. Surjectivity of E0 is Lemma 9.4.1, label-preservation is Lemma 9.2.1,
continuity is Lemma 9.2.2, and dynamicity is Lemma 9.2.4.
We wish to show that IΣ is always finite. For this, we will first show that irreducible
frames cannot be too ‘tall’, which will be a consequence of the next lemma.
Lemma 9.7. Let w be an irreducible Σ-moment and v, w ∈ |w|. Then, if v 4 w and
`(v) = `(w), it follows that v = w.
Proof. We proceed by induction on hgt(w): if w 6= rw, then by Lemma 9.4.2, w[w] is
irreducible and we can apply the induction hypothesis. So, we may assume otherwise. We
may also assume that v ≺1 rw; for, if rw = v, there is nothing to prove, and if not, choose v′
such that rw 1 v′ < v; then, `(rw) ⊆ `(v′) ⊆ `(v) = `(rw), so we also have `(v′) = `(rw).
Then, define pi by pi(v) = rw, pi(u) = u otherwise. It is readily seen that pi is a reduction
and v 6∈ pi|w|, contradicting the irreducibility of w.
Let us define the height of w as the largest n so that there exists a chain w1 ≺w w2 . . . ≺w
wn and write n = hgt(w). The following is then immediate from Lemma 9.7.
Corollary 9.8. If Σ b L and w is an irreducible Σ-moment, then hgt(w) ≤ #Σ + 1.
Next we will give a bound on the size of irreducible moments. Our bound will be
superexponential; recall that the superexponential 2mn is defined by recursion on n by
2m0 = m and 2
m
n+1 = 2
2mn . We begin with a useful inequality:
Lemma 9.9. For all m,n, k ≥ 1, 2m · 2(n−1)mk ≤ 2nmk .
Proof. Proceed by induction on k. If k = 1, then
2m · 2(n−1)mk = 2m · 2(n−1)m = 2nmk .
If k > 1, then note that 1 ≤ 2(n−1)mk−1 , so that
m+ 2
(n−1)m
k−1 ≤ (m+ 1)2(n−1)mk−1 ≤ 2m · 2(n−1)mk−1
IH≤ 2nmk−1.
Then,
2m · 2(n−1)mk = 2m · 22
(n−1)m
k−1 = 2m+2
(n−1)m
k−1 ≤ 22nmk−1 = 2nmk ,
as needed.
Lemma 9.10. If Σ b LI♦ and s = #Σ > 0, then #IΣ ≤ 2s
2+s
s+1 .
Proof. We prove, by induction on n, that there are at most 2nsn irreducible moments with
height n. Note that there are no moments of height 0, and 0 = 20s0 . So, we may assume
n ≥ 1. Any irreducible of height at most n is of the form [ΦA], where Φ ⊆ Σ and A is a set of
distinct irreducibles of height less than n. There are at most 2s choices for Φ. By induction
hypothesis, there are at most 2
(n−1)s
n−1 possible elements for A, and thus 2
2
(n−1)s
n−1 = 2
(n−1)s
n
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x
SX
y
w
SΣ
χ
v
SΣ
χv′
χ0
Figure 5: A diagram illustrating Lemma 9.12.2b.
choices for A. Hence there are at most 2s · 2(n−1)sn ≤ 2nsn such w. The lemma then follows by
choosing n = s+ 1, the greatest value that hgt(w) could take.
Now that we know that IΣ is finite, it would be convenient if, whenever χ is a simulation
and w is any Σ-moment such that w χ x, we could replace w by some irreducible w′ E w
and still have w′ χ x. The following operations on simulations will help us achieve this.
Definition 9.11. Let Σ b ∆ ⊆ LI♦ both closed under subformulas, X be a ∆-labelled space,
and χ ⊆MΣ × |X|.
(1) Define the reductive closure of χ by χˇ = χE. If χˇ = χ, we say χ is reductive.
(2) Define the irreducible part of χ by χ0 = χ  IΣ.
In other words, w χˇ x means that there is v such that w E v χ x. Let us see that these
operations indeed produce new simulations.
Lemma 9.12. Suppose that Σ b LI♦, X is a labelled system, and χ ⊆ MΣ × |X| is a
simulation. Then,
(1) χˇ and χ0 are also simulations.
(2) If χ is reductive, then
(a) χ0(IΣ) = χ(MΣ), and
(b) if w χ x SX y, v χ y, and w SΣ v, there is v
′ such that v′ χ0 y and w SΣ v′.
Proof. That χˇ is a simulation is immediate from Lemma 8.4.1, and it is easily seen that χ0
is a simulation using Lemma 8.4.2.
For claim 2a, it is obvious that χ0(IΣ) ⊆ χ(MΣ). For the other inclusion, assume that
χ is reductive. Consider x ∈ χ(MΣ), so that there is w ∈MΣ with w χ x. By Lemma 9.6,
E0 is surjective, so we can pick w′ with w′ E0 w; since χ is reductive, it follows that w′ χ x,
and hence x ∈ χ0(IΣ), as needed.
For Claim 2b, choose v′ E0 v, so that, as above, v′ χ0 y. Meanwhile, since w E w and
w SΣ v, we can use Lemma 9.2.4 to conclude that w SΣ v
′.
10. Simulating Dynamical Systems
Our work with irreducibles shows that if we can construct a surjective, dynamic simulation
on MΣ, then we immediately get a surjective, dynamic simulation on IΣ, which we can then
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use to construct finite quasimodels. In this section, we will show how such simulations can
be found; specifically, we will show that maximal simulations have all required properties.
Lemma 10.1. Given any labelled space X and Σ b LI♦, there exists a greatest simulation
χ∗ ⊆MΣ × |X|. Moreover, χ∗ is reductive.
Proof. By Lemma 8.4.3,
χ∗ =
⋃
{χ ⊆MΣ × |X| : χ is a simulation}
is a simulation, and clearly this is the greatest simulation. By Lemma 9.12, χˇ∗ is also a
simulation, hence χˇ∗ ⊆ χ∗, and thus χ∗ is reductive.
If X is a labelled system then χ∗ gives us a surjective, dynamic simulation. The following
lemma will be essential in proving this.
Lemma 10.2. Let Σ b LI♦, X be a labelled space, and χ ⊆MΣ × |X| be a simulation.
Suppose that Φ ⊆ Σ and A ⊆ MΣ are a Σ-kit (as in Definition 7.8), and that there
is x∗ ∈ |X| such that (1) `X(x∗) ∩ Σ = Φ, and (2) for all w ∈ A, x∗ ∈ χ(w). Then,
ζ = χ ∪
{([
Φ
A
]
, x∗
)}
is also a simulation.
Proof. Note, first, that ζ is label-preserving; let us prove that it is also continuous. Consider
an arbitrary open set U ⊆ |X|. We must show that ζ −1(U) is open. So, let w ∈ ζ −1(U),
and assume that v 4 w; we must show that v ∈ ζ −1(U). Obviously the latter holds if w = v,
so we assume v ≺ w. Pick x ∈ U such that w ζ x. If x 6= x∗ or w 6=
[
Φ
A
]
, then we already
have w χ x, and hence v ∈ χ−1(U) ⊆ ζ −1(U). So, assume that x = x∗ and w =
[
Φ
A
]
. Then,
there is v′ ∈ A such that v 4 v′. By assumption, x∗ ∈ χ(v′); hence, since U is open, there is
y ∈ U such that v′ χ y. But χ is continuous and U is a neighborhood of y, so there is z ∈ U
such that v χ z, hence v ζ z as needed.
Proposition 10.3. Let Σ b ∆ ⊆ LI♦ both be closed under subformulas. Then, for any
∆-labelled space X, χ∗ ⊆MΣ × |X| is surjective.
Proof. Since we know that χ∗ is reductive, it suffices to show that a reductive simulation
that is not surjective is not maximal. Thus, let χ ⊆MΣ × |X| be any reductive simulation.
Say a point x ∈ X is bad if it does not lie in the range of χ. We claim that χ is not maximal
if there are bad points.
If there are bad points, let x∗ ∈ |X| be a bad point such that Φ := `(x∗)∩Σ is ⊆-maximal
among all bad points. Let U∗ be a neighborhood of x∗ minimizing #χ−10 (U∗) (which is
finite by Lemma 9.10), and such that U∗ ⊆ JϕKX for all ϕ ∈ Φ. We claim that for each
defect δ = (ϕ⇒ψ) ∈ ∂Φ, there is uδ ∈ χ−10 (U∗) revoking δ. To see this, note that by the
semantics of ⇒, there is xδ ∈ U∗ such that xδ ∈ JϕKX \ JψKX. But, since xδ ∈ U∗, it follows
that `(xδ) ∩ Σ ⊇ Φ, and since ϕ ∈ `(xδ) \ `(x∗), the inclusion is strict. By maximality of Φ
it follows that xδ is not bad, hence xδ ∈ χ(v) for some v ∈MΣ. By Lemma 9.4, there is an
irreducible uδ E v, and since χ is reductive, uδ χ xδ, so that uδ ∈ χ−10 (U∗). By the minimality
of #χ−10 (U∗) we see that if U is any neighborhood of x then uδ ∈ χ−10 (U ∩U∗) ⊆ χ−10 (U), so
that x∗ ∈ χ(uδ).
Let A be the set of all uδ such that δ ∈ ∂Φ. By Lemma 7.9, w∗ =
[
Φ
A
]
is a Σ-moment,
and we can set
ζ = χ ∪ {([ΦA], x∗)}.
By Lemma 10.2, ζ is a simulation. Since x∗ was bad, χ ( ζ, as desired.
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Proposition 10.4. Given Σ b ∆ ⊆ LI♦ both closed under subformulas and a ∆-labelled
system X, χ∗ ⊆MΣ × |X| is a dynamic simulation.
Proof. The proof follows much the same structure as that of Proposition 10.3. Let χ be a
reductive simulation, which in view of Proposition 10.3, we may assume to be surjective.
Suppose further that χ is not dynamic; we will show that it cannot be maximal.
Say that (x, y) ∈ SX fails for w if w χ x but there is no v ∈ χ−1(y) such that w SΣ v. We
will show that χ is not maximal if any pair fails for any moment. If this were the case, pick
w∗ of minimal height such that some pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ SX fails for it. Let V∗ be a neighborhood
of y∗ such that #χ−10 (V∗) is minimal and V∗ ⊆ JϕKX whenever ϕ ∈ Ψ := `(y∗) ∩ Σ.
As before, for each defect δ of `(y∗), choose uδ ∈ χ−10 (V∗) revoking δ. Next, for each
v such that v ≺ w, we claim there is v′ ∈ χ−10 (V∗) such that v SΣ v′. To see this, using
the continuity of SX, let U be a neighborhood of x∗ such that U ⊆ S−1X (V∗). Since χ is
continuous, there is xv ∈ U such that v χ xv, and by our choice of U there is yv ∈ V∗
such that xv SX yv. Since hgt(v) < hgt(w), by the induction hypothesis, there is v
′′ such
that v SΣ v
′′ χ yv. But χ is reductive, so that by Lemma 9.12.2b, there is v′ such that
v′ χ0 yv ∈ V∗ and v SΣ v′, as needed.
Let
B =
{
uδ : δ ∈ ∂`(y∗)
} ∪ {v′ : v ≺ w}.
By the minimality of #χ−10 (V∗) we see that y∗ ∈ χ(b) for all b ∈ B. By Lemma 7.9, v∗ =
[
Ψ
B
]
is a Σ-moment and w∗ SΣ v∗ by Lemma 7.9.2.
We can then set
ζ = χ ∪ {(v∗, y∗)} .
As before, ζ is a simulation which properly contains χ. Therefore, χ is not maximal.
We are now ready to prove that ITLc♦ has the effective finite quasimodel property and
hence is decidable.
Definition 10.5. If Σ b ∆ ⊆ LI♦ are both closed under subformulas and X is a ∆-labelled
space, we define X/Σ = IΣ  dom(χ∗).
Proposition 10.6. Let Σ b ∆ ⊆ LI♦ be closed under subformulas and X be a well ∆-labelled
system. Then, if X falsifies ϕ ∈ Σ, it follows that X/Σ is a Σ-quasimodel falsifying ϕ.
Proof. By Propositions 10.3 and 10.4, χ∗ is a surjective dynamic simulation, so by Lemmas
8.2 and 8.5, X/Σ is a Σ-quasimodel. Now, fix ϕ ∈ Σ and x ∈ |X|. By Proposition 10.3, χ∗0 is
surjective, so if there is x ∈ |X| \ JϕKX there exists w ∈ IΣ such that x ∈ χ∗(w) and hence
ϕ 6∈ `(w).
This gives us a finite quasimodel property for ITLc♦.
Theorem 10.7. A formula ϕ ∈ LI♦ is falsifiable on a dynamical system if and only if it is
falsifiable on a quasimodel of size at most 2
(‖ϕ‖+1)‖ϕ‖
‖ϕ‖ .
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ LI♦ and Σ = sub(ϕ). By Proposition 6.9, if ϕ is falsifiable on a Σ-quasimodel,
then it is falsifiable on a dynamic topological model. Conversely, if ϕ is falsifiable on a
dynamic topological model X, then by regarding X as a well LI♦-labelled system we see using
Proposition 10.6 that ϕ is falsifiable on a Σ-quasimodel of the form Q = X/Σ, which is a
substructure of IΣ. Since Q has at most 2
(‖ϕ‖+1)‖ϕ‖
‖ϕ‖ worlds, our result follows.
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•
f(x) •
xαpi
Figure 6: If α is irrational, then a rotation by αpi gives rise to a minimal system on the unit
circle.
From this our main result is immediate.
Theorem 10.8. ITLc♦ is decidable.
11. Special Classes of Systems
Now that we have seen that ITLc♦ is decidable, let us turn our attention to its capacity to
reason about recurrence phenomena. The operator ♦ allows us to express properties of the
asymptotic behavior of dynamical topological systems; this behavior is often more interesting
when these systems have additional structural properties. We will discuss two special classes
which exhibit non-trivial asymptotic behavior, and show that ITLc♦ can describe this behavior
in both cases. We begin by discussing minimal systems.
11.1. Minimal systems. Minimal systems, introduced in [9], are dynamical systems that
exhibit characteristic asymptotic behavior which can be captured in the language of DTL.
We will recall a few basic properties for minimal dynamical systems; a deeper treatment can
be found in a text such as [1].
If X is a dynamical system and Y ⊆ |X| is such that fX(Y ) ⊆ Y , then X  Y denotes
the dynamical system
(Y, TX  Y, fX  Y ) ,
where TX  Y is the subspace topology on Y induced by TX; to be precise,
(TX  Y ) = {U ∩ Y : U ∈ TX}.
Definition 11.1. Let X and Y be dynamical systems. We will say that Y is a subsystem
of X, written Y ≤ X, if there exists a non-empty closed set Y ⊆ |X| which is closed under
fX and such that Y = X  Y .
The dynamical system X is minimal if it is minimal under ≤; that is, if it contains no
proper subsystems.
While it is not true in general that a dynamical system X has a minimal subsystem, the
following theorem of Birkhoff [9] shows that this is the case if we assume X to be compact.
28 DAVID FERNA´NDEZ-DUQUE
Theorem 11.2 (Birkhoff). If X is a dynamical system based on a compact space, then there
exists a minimal Y ≤ X.
The result is proven using Zorn’s lemma. An alternative, and sometimes more useful,
characterization of minimal systems is given by the following:
Proposition 11.3. A dynamical system X is minimal if and only if the orbit of every point
is dense in |X|.
Proof. Suppose that X is minimal and let x ∈ |X|. Let Y be the the closure of the orbit of x:
Y =
{
fnX(x) : n < ω
}
.
It is not hard to check that Y is a closed subset of X that is closed under fX; since X is
minimal, it follows that Y = |X|, which means that the orbit of x is dense in |X|.
Now, suppose that X is not minimal, and let Z ( |X| be non-empty, closed, and fX-closed.
Note that Z itself cannot be dense since it is already closed. Then, it is clear that for any
x ∈ Z, the orbit of x lies in Z, and since Z is closed, the closure of the orbit of x is also a
subset of Z. Thus the orbit of x is not dense in |X|.
An example of a minimal system is given by a rotation of the unit circle S1 by an angle
αpi, where α is irrational. It is well-known that under such a rotation, the orbit of every
point of S1 is dense, and hence this gives us a minimal system (see Figure 6). Note that
minimal systems do not have to be connected or surjective; Figure 7 gives an example of a
minimal system that is neither, and compact, Hausorff examples can be found in [6, 11].
The dynamic topological logic of minimal systems is well-understood [20]:
Theorem 11.4. Let X be a dynamical system. Then, X is minimal if and only if
X |= ∃p→ ∀♦p.
Theorem 11.5. Let DTLm denote the set of valid formulas of LC over the class of minimal
systems. Then, DTLm is decidable.
As we will see, analogous results hold for LI . First, observe that decidability is readily
inherited from the classical setting:
Theorem 11.6. Let ITLm denote the set of valid formulas of LI over the class of minimal
systems. Then, ITLm is decidable.
Proof. We know that ϕ ∈ LI is valid over the class of minimal systems if and only if ϕ
is. Thus, the validity problem of ITLm can be reduced to that of DTLm; since the latter is
decidable, so is the former.
Example 11.7. Figure 7 gives an example of an Alexandroff dynamical system m, where
fm is not open. Note that the set {w, z} is dense, and the orbit of every point contains these
two points, so the system is minimal. If we let JpK = {y, z} and JqK = {z}, then it is readily
verified that v 6∈ J(◦p⇒◦q)⇒◦(p⇒ q)K, hence (◦p⇒◦q)⇒◦(p⇒ q) 6∈ ITLm.
Remark 11.8. The set of valid formulas of DTLm is not primitive recursively decidable,
hence the above argument does not settle whether ITLm is. One could combine the proof of
Theorem 10.8 with the proof in [20] of Theorem 11.5 to obtain a primitive recursive decision
procedure; nevertheless, the procedure thus obtained would most likely remain non-elementary
without some non-trivial modifications.
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w
v
z
y
x
Figure 7: An Alexandroff minimal system m with the down-set topology. Dashed arrows
indicate 4, solid arrows fm.
As for characterizing minimality in LI (indeed, in LI♦), we may actually do this more
succinctly than in LC :
Theorem 11.9. Let X be a dynamical system. Then, X is minimal if and only if
X |= ∃p⇒♦p. (11.1)
Proof. First assume that X is any minimal dynamical system and J·K is any valuation on X.
Suppose that x ∈ J∃pK. Then, JpK is non-empty and open; since the orbit of x is dense, it
follows that fnX(x) ∈ JpK for some n, that is, x ∈ J♦pK.
Conversely, if X is not minimal, let Y be a non-empty, proper, closed, fX-closed subset
of |X|. Then, if J·K is any valuation satisfying JpK = |X| \ Y and x ∈ Y , it is not hard to
check that x 6∈ J∃p⇒♦pK.
As a corollary, we obtain the following:
Corollary 11.10. Over the class of minimal systems, ♦ is definable by ♦ϕ⇔∃ϕ.
In view of Lemma 3.7, we may also define ♦ϕ⇔∼∀∼ϕ, and thus the language LI  {◦, ∀}
is equally expressive as LI♦. This makes LI  {◦, ∀} (i.e., the language with modalities ◦,∀), or
even LI  {◦,∃}, be particularly attractive for reasoning about minimal dynamical systems.
11.2. Poncare´ recurrence. Finally, we turn our attention to probability-preserving sys-
tems. The DTL of such systems is not as well-understood as that of minimal systems;
nevertheless, the Poincare´ recurrence theorem, one of the motivations for the study of DTL,
holds in this class of systems.
Definition 11.11. A dynamical system X is probabilty preserving if there exists a probability
measure pi on |X| such that
(1) if U ⊆ |X| is open and non-empty, then U is measurable and pi(U) 6= 0;
(2) for every measurable set Y ⊆ |X|, we have pi(Y ) = pi(f−1X (Y )).
Probability-preserving systems have the following property, discovered by Poincare´ [39];
a more modern presentation can be found in [1].
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•
f(x) •
xϑ
Figure 8: A rotation f of a disk by an angle ϑ gives rise to a probability-preserving system,
where the probability of a set is defined to be proportional to its area. Note that ϑ
no longer needs to be an irrational multiple of pi, unlike in Figure 6. Moreover, such
a system is not minimal, as (for example) the dashed circle is a closed, f -closed
subsystem.
Theorem 11.12. If X is a probability-preserving system and U ⊆ |X| is open, then U
contains a recurrent point, i.e. there is x ∈ U such that fnX(x) ∈ U for some n > 0.
As observed by Kremer and Mints in [32], Poincare´ recurrence can readily be expressed
in the language of DTL.
Theorem 11.13. The LC formula
p→ ◦♦p (11.2)
is valid over the class of probability-preserving systems, but not valid in general.
Poincare´ recurrence is also expressible in LI♦. Below, say that a dynamical system X is
Poincare´ recurrent if every non-empty open set U ⊆ |X| contains a recurrent point.
Theorem 11.14. A dynamical system X is Poincare´ recurrent if and only if
X |= p⇒∼∼◦♦p. (11.3)
Proof. First assume that X is Poincare´ recurrent, and let J·K be any valuation on X. Let
U ⊆ JpK be open and non-empty. Then, U contains a recurrent point; that is, there are
x ∈ U and n > 0 such that fnX(x) ∈ U . It follows that x ∈ J◦♦pK, and since U ⊆ JpK was
arbitrary, using Lemma 3.4 we conclude that X |= p⇒∼∼◦♦p.
Conversely, if X is not Poincare´ recurrent, let U ⊆ |X| be a non-empty open set with
no recurrent point. Set JpK = U and choose x ∈ U ; then, it is easy to check that x 6∈ J◦♦pK.
Since x ∈ U is arbitrary we conclude that U ∩ J◦♦pK = ∅, hence J◦♦pK = ∅ is not dense inJpK, and X 6|= p⇒∼∼◦♦p.
Remark 11.15. Despite being able to capture minimality and Poincare´ recurrence, LI has
less expressive power than LC , since the former can only reason about open sets. Thus, we
should expect the intuitionistic language to have some limitations. One example of this might
be given by strong Poincare´ recurrence.
Say that a dynamical system X is strongly Poincare´ recurrent if every non-empty open
U ⊆ |X| has an infinitely recurrent point; that is, there is x ∈ U such that fnX(x) ∈ U
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Class Notation LC LI♦ LI
All dynamical systems c Undecidable [28] but c.e.
[18]
Decidable Unknown
but c.e.
Dynamical systems with
a homeomorphism
h Non-c.e. [29] Unknown Unknown
Expanding frames e Undecidable [28] Decidable Decidable
[10]
Persistent frames p Non-c.e. [29] Unknown Unknown
Minimal systems m Decidable, but not prim-
itive recursive [20]
Decidable Decidable
Poincare´ recurrent sys-
tems
r Unknown Unknown Unknown
Table 2: This table indicates whether the set of formulas of a given language is decidable
over different classes of dynamical systems. Note that the notations h, r have not
been introduced previously in the text.
for infinitely many n. Then, Theorem 11.12 can be strengthened to conclude that any
probability-preserving system is strongly Poincare´ recurrent.
One can then reason as in the proof of Theorem 11.14 to conclude that X |= p→ ♦p
if and only X it is strongly Poincare´ recurrent. However, given that the set of infinitely
recurrent points need not be open, it is unlikely that LI can characterize strongly Poincare´
recurrent systems in this fashion.
12. Concluding Remarks
We have presented ITLc♦, a variant of Kremer’s intuitionistic dynamic topological logic, and
shown it to be decidable; we summarize the known decidability results in Table 2. We
also showed that the language of ITLc♦ is expressive enough to characterize minimality and
Poincare´ recurrence, two key properties which sparked interest in DTL. This makes ITLc♦
arguably be the first decidable logic suitable for reasoning about non-trivial asymptotic
behavior of dynamical topological systems. Nevertheless, our techniques are model-theoretic
and do not yield an axiomatization, raising the following:
Question 12.1. Is there a natural axiomatization for ITLc and/or its fragments?
Note also that the decision procedure we have given is not elementary, since the size
of IΣ grows super-exponentially on ‖ϕ‖. Nevertheless, there is little reason to assume that
this procedure is optimal; we constructed IΣ so that a surjective simulation onto any model
could always be found, but surjectivity is not necessarily required to falsify a given formula.
Hence, a sharp lower bound on the complexity of ITLc♦ remains to be found.
Question 12.2. What is the complexity of the validity problem in ITLc♦?
In case that such a bound is intractable, there are other natural variants of DTL in the
spirit of ITLc♦ which may have lower complexity. One could view the topological semantics
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of intuitionistic logic as a restriction of the classical semantics to the algebra of open sets.
However, this is not the only important topologically-defined algebra: the sub-algebra of
regular open (or closed) sets has already been studied in the context of spatial reasoning
[16, 36], and Lando has studied DTL modulo sets of measure zero [34]. A reduced semantics
modulo meager sets (i.e., countable unions of nowhere-dense sets) would also be meaningful
in the context of dynamical systems. For the definitions and basic properties of these
algebras, we refer the reader to a text such as [24].
A separate strategy for finding tractable fragments could be to impose additional syntac-
tical restrictions to LI♦, such as limiting the number of embedded implications. Minimality
is characterized using only one implication, and Poincare´ recurrence uses three,6 so that
such restricted systems might suffice for applications. This strategy has been successfully
employed to obtain tractable fragments of the polymodal provability logic GLP [7, 12], which,
like DTL, is topologically complete but not Kripke complete [8]. This raises the following:
Question 12.3. Can tractable and useful variants of ITLc be obtained by
(a) using different spatial algebras, or
(b) restricting the syntax to suitable fragments?
Most of the classes of systems we have considered give rise to logics different from ITLc,
as depicted in Figure 9. All inclusions in the figure follow from one class being contained in
the other, except for ITLQ ⊆ ITLc, which is Theorem 4.6. Moreover:
(1) ITLh is the only logic in the figure containing ∀◦p⇒∀p, which is valid over systems with
a surjective function.
(2) ITLe and ITLp contain p⇒◦p, which is not in ITLRn (Example 4.1). They also
contain (6.1), which is neither in ITLR
n
nor in ITLh, given that the function in Example
6.10 uses a homeomorphism.
(3) ITLh and ITLp are the only logics containing (◦p⇒◦q)⇒◦(p⇒ q); this formula is valid
over systems with an open function.
(4) ITLr and ITLm are the only logics containing (11.3) (Theorem 11.12),
(5) ITLm is the only logic containing (11.1) (Theorem 11.9), and
(6) ITLR
n
is the only logic containing (6.2) [40].
We leave a full proof of these claims to the reader; one useful counter-example for this is
given by Figure 7, which presents a disconnected, non-invertible Alexandroff minimal system.
Only the following questions are left open by this analysis:
Question 12.4. Do the inclusions ITLe ⊆ ITLr or ITLe ⊆ ITLm hold?
Other than Question 12.4, Figure 9 is complete (in the sense that all inclusions are
shown), and remains complete if we replace the logics by the respective LI♦ fragments.
Given that these logics are mostly distinct, it is an interesting open problem whether
intuitionistic temporal logics over special classes of systems are more feasible than their
classical counterparts. For example, DTLm is decidable, unlike the unrestricted DTL: perhaps
ITLm♦ also has lower complexity than ITL
c
♦? Similarly, it is not known if DTL over Poincare´
recurrent systems is decidable, but settling the decidability of intuitionistic temporal logic
over this class may be a more accessible problem.
6In fact, in view of the intuitionistic tautology (p⇒∼∼◦♦p)⇔∼(p ∧ ∼◦♦p), two implications suffice to
characterize Poincare´ recurrence.
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ITLc = ITLQ
ITLh ITLe
ITLp
ITLr
ITLm
ITLR
n
Figure 9: Inclusions among logics we have considered, with notation as in Table 2.
Question 12.5. Which of the unknown logics of Table 2 are decidable, and what is their
complexity?
Finally, we leave open the question of the decidability of Kremer’s original logic over
the {◦,}-fragment.
Question 12.6. Is ITLc decidable?
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